Solidarity With OTHERS published a report in July 2026 examining the Turkish Maarif Foundation’s role in the closure, transfer and restructuring of educational institutions linked to the Gülen movement following the attempted coup in Türkiye in July 2016.
The report, Turkish Maarif Foundation and the Global Attack on Gülen Schools: 10 Years of Transnational Repression in Practice, examines the Foundation’s legal status, governance and public funding. It also considers the diplomatic and administrative processes through which institutions were closed, confiscated or transferred in different countries.
According to the report, at least 162 educational institutions in 29 countries were affected. It estimates that 131 institutions were transferred to the Turkish Maarif Foundation, while 31 were closed without transfer or were otherwise confiscated by state authorities. Approximately 7,800 teachers and administrative staff were affected.
The authors say the figures are based on data assembled for court documentation purposes as of March 2023. The publication also compares 14 country cases and draws on legislation, official records, court decisions, public statements, academic research and media reporting.
State-linked structure and public funding
The Turkish Maarif Foundation was established under Law No. 6721, adopted on 17 June 2016 and published in the Official Gazette later that month. Its statutory responsibilities include providing formal and non-formal education abroad, establishing schools and other educational facilities, awarding scholarships and taking over existing institutions.
The Foundation is authorised, alongside the Ministry of National Education, to establish educational institutions abroad on behalf of the Republic of Türkiye. It may also purchase, lease or assume control of institutions and establish or acquire private companies to carry out its activities.
The report describes this arrangement as a hybrid structure combining the legal form of a non-profit foundation with executive appointments, public funding and responsibilities normally associated with state institutions. Its governing bodies include executive appointees and representatives of the ministries responsible for education, foreign affairs and finance, as well as the Council of Higher Education.
The publication also discusses a 2018 judgment of Türkiye’s Constitutional Court, which rejected challenges to several provisions of the Foundation’s establishing law. According to the report, the Court recognised that foundations created for public purposes could receive particular privileges and operate under a different legal framework. It also noted the presence of state representatives, public financial support and administrative oversight within the Foundation’s structure.
Annual transfers from the Ministry of National Education form an important part of the Foundation’s financing. The report says the maximum amount authorised for transfer rose from approximately TL1.87 billion in 2022 to nearly TL6.78 billion in 2025. It stresses that these figures are authorised ceilings rather than confirmed expenditure.
Citing media reporting, the publication also refers to a reported allocation of TL7.8 billion for 2026. It notes continuing domestic debate over financial transparency, audit arrangements and the relationship between the Foundation and the Ministry of National Education.
Transfers and closures across different legal systems
Following the attempted coup of 15 July 2016, the Turkish government blamed the Gülen movement and pursued action against institutions and individuals it considered connected to it. The report argues that the Turkish Maarif Foundation subsequently became a central operational instrument in the government’s overseas campaign concerning Gülen-linked education networks.
Because institutions outside Türkiye could not be closed through Turkish domestic emergency legislation, the report says any closure or transfer required action by the authorities of the country where a school operated. Turkish diplomatic engagement and the Foundation’s capacity to assume control of institutions were therefore central to the process described by the authors.
The report identifies several recurring mechanisms. These included negotiated handovers, withdrawal of operating licences, executive or ministerial decisions, ownership restructuring, security operations and, in some cases, court proceedings. The authors say the processes frequently involved Turkish embassies, senior political visits and direct negotiations between Foundation representatives and host-country officials.
The 14 detailed country cases show that the outcomes and legal procedures varied. In Mali, the report describes executive closure, legislative changes and transfer to the Foundation. In Niger, it documents an executive decision followed by judicial challenges. The Tunisia case concerns changes in ownership and the withdrawal of an administrative licence, while the Liberia case describes the removal of personnel and closure without a formal judicial process.
Other cases include transfers following bilateral agreements, administrative revocations and interventions by security services. Rwanda is presented as an example where institutions were closed following diplomatic engagement but were not transferred to the Turkish Maarif Foundation.
The report also acknowledges that Turkish requests did not produce the same result in every country. It cites resistance by some national authorities, including Indonesia, where officials maintained that recognised institutions were governed by domestic law.
Official figures cited in the publication differ from the authors’ estimate. In a 2022 Foundation bulletin, its then president, Birol Akgün, said it had taken over 234 schools in 20 countries and opened 172 schools in 29 countries. The report says part of the difference may result from counting primary, secondary and upper-secondary sections at one institution as separate schools.
International legal assessment
The final section considers the documented events under Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. It examines whether the conduct described could meet elements associated with persecution as a crime against humanity.
The authors assess alleged deprivations of property rights, employment and access to justice, as well as what they describe as political targeting. They also consider whether the actions were connected to a broader pattern, whether that pattern was widespread or systematic, and whether the necessary knowledge and intent were present.
The report concludes that there is a “reasonable basis to consider” that the acts, viewed cumulatively, may amount to persecution under the Rome Statute. This is the authors’ legal assessment rather than a finding by an international court.
According to the report, the similarities between cases indicate that the reassignment of Gülen-linked educational institutions should not be viewed solely as a series of unrelated national measures. The authors conclude that the Turkish Maarif Foundation operated as an important mechanism within a coordinated transnational policy involving Turkish authorities and cooperating host states.